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1. Introduction 
The vast majority of English-speaking people who have now heard of the work of Arne 
Naess know of him primarily in association with his work on deep ecology. Being largely 
unaware of the intellectual range, thirty-five year history, and considerable influence - 
especially in Scandinavia - of his earlier work, they are therefore largely unaware that the 
theme of "depth" has pervaded more or less all of Naess' work. In particular, this theme 
was central to the work for which Naess was best known among professional 
philosophers prior to his work on ecophilosophy, namely, his philosophy of language and 
communication, which he referred to as empirical semantics (for reasons we shall come 
to)..1. 
In this paper, written in the year (1992) of Naess' eightieth birthday, I would like to 
explore what I believe may be the main intellectual origins of the depth theme in Naess' 
work. Specifically, I want to suggest that Naess' involvement in psychoanalysis and 
involvement with the Vienna Circle jointly informed the development of his work on 
empirical semantics and that this work, in turn, fed into his later development of what he 
chose to refer to as a deep approach (meaning a deep questioning approach) to ecological 
concerns. In telling the story of Naess' involvement in psychoanalysis and with the 
Vienna Circle we will also gain some insight into a number of the main emotional and 
intellectual influences that affected him during his childhood, teenage years, and early 
adulthood. 
The focal point of the story is Vienna, 1934, when Naess was twenty-two. Early in that 
year Naess "found [himself] in Austria eager to climb mountains and to study.".2. Even 
though this was still the Austria of an intellectually great and culturally vibrant Vienna, 
the Vienna of Freud and of the Wiener Kreis (Vienna Circle), Naess' reason for going 
there had more to do with his love of mountains than his attraction to academic life: 
"Valuing mountaineering and life among mountains higher than university studies, I 
chose to live in Switzerland after receiving the degree of Master of Arts (University of 
Oslo, 1933), but after comparing prices I went to Austria instead.".3. 
While Naess' presence in Austria was thus more or less accidental from the viewpoint of 
his academic motivations, it nevertheless afforded him direct contact with both 
psychoanalysis and the Vienna Circle. I consider these two influences in turn. 
2. Psychoanalysis and Naess' Formative Years 
When Naess found himself in Vienna in early 1934, psychoanalysis was "very close to 
the centre of cultural attention." It was therefore "inevitable," says Naess, that he should 
ask himself: "If I am to be an honest philosopher or scientist, would it not be prudent to 
go through a psychoanalysis?" The decision to do so provided a distinctly modern twist to 
the Socratic view, already "emphatically endorsed" by Naess, that "The unexamined life 
is not worth living"! "Soon," says Naess,
I was in a deadly serious 14-month analysis, 8 to 9 a.m. every morning, 
except Sundays, with the old collaborator of Freud, Edward Hitschmann. 
We were both somewhat astonished to find that I had suffered a 
pronounced childhood neurosis. It had obvious consequences for my later 
life, and the analysis turned into a combined character analysis and analysis 
of my philosophical inclinations. [This is also the path I will take in the 
remainder of this section on "Psychoanalysis and Naess' Formative 
Years.") 
Naess describes the origins of this psychoanalytically revealed neurosis as follows: 
The feeling apart seemed to stem from a basic catastrophe in my earliest 
life. Because of the death of my father when I was only one year old, and 
the preoccupation of my mother with my two brothers who were in their 
early teens, I was left to the care of a maid. She was excessively kind and 
submitted to all my wishes. Thus, in summer time I would not tolerate to be 
put into the bath-tub except together with a fly. She had to fetch a specimen 
through climbing up the windows. She was dismissed because of her 
excesses when I was three years old, and I was never able to love my 
mother properly as a substitute. It seemed that I experienced the change as 
a loss of a whole world, and that I managed to procure a new one. 
What was this new world that Naess managed to procure?: 
From when I was about four years old until puberty I could stand or sit for 
hours, days, weeks, in shallow water on the coast, inspecting and 
marvelling at the overwhelming diversity and richness of life in the sea. 
The tiny beautiful forms which 'nobody' cared for, or were even unable to 
see, was part of a seemingly infinite world, but nevertheless my world. 
Feeling apart in many human relationships, I identified with 'nature.' 
Naess' early identification with the nonhuman world was so profound that he sees the 
attitudes it engendered as having informed his entire mature philosophy. After describing 
the world of the "infant shorelines naturalist" in sympathetic detail - a world of friendly 
sole, conflict-avoiding crabs, and inquisitive translucent shrimps - Naess notes that "Two 
things of clear relevance to philosophy in general and to my philosophy in particular are 
elucidated by the above: an enthusiasm for diversity, [and] a lack of incentive to judge 
something (some life forms) as unquestionably higher, nobler, more right, than any 
other." 
From about the age of eight, Naess' strong identification with the nonhuman world had 
reached the point where a particular mountain had become for him a symbol of a 
benevolent, equiminded, strong 'father,' or of an ideal human nature. [Recall that Naess' 
own father had died when he was one.] These characteristics were there in spite of the 
obvious fact that the mountain, with its slippery stones, icy fog and dangerous precipices, 
did not protect me or care for me in any trivial sense. It required me to show respect and 
take care. The mountain loved me but in a way similar to that of my ten and eleven years 
older brothers who were eager to toughen me up. 
As with his early shoreline experiences, Naess also sees his mountain-as-father 
experiences as significant for the development of his mature philosophy. In particular, his 
cult of a particular mountain "reduced the need for anything supernatural, anything 
protecting us directly, or guaranteeing the meaningfulness of life." There were other 
philosophical lessons too, from this mountain and from others. For example, living in 
mountains necessarily inspired such qualities as "austerity" and "toughness," qualities that 
Naess relates to his youthful "detestation and fear of being influenced by manifestations 
of spirituality and high-sounding notions." And the views from mountains drove home 
the importance of such qualities as "distance," "perspective," "aloofness," "breadth of 
survey," "contemplation of the totality," "being 'above' things," "unruffledness," and 
"equimindedness." 
These qualities all represent key-terms in understanding both Naess and his professional 
philosophical work. However, in summing up the philosophical significance of both his 
early shoreline and mountain experiences, the points that Naess emphasizes are again 
those of "egalitarianism [which, for Naess, amounts to a restatement in positive terms of 
his "lack of incentive to judge something (some life forms) as unquestionably higher, 
nobler, more right, than any other"] and the value of diversity." To these he also adds 
A third, developed through the combined influence of these two: a certain form of 
scepticism. Some points of view (like some animals), are clearly vulnerable from some 
other points of view (or some other animals), but why imagine that one definite point of 
view (one kind of living being) would not be vulnerable from any other? What value 
would there be in having something defeat all others? 
These attitudes were reinforced during Naess' teenage years when his naturalist interests 
began to take in theoretical concerns as well. Naess makes special note in this regard of 
H. G. Wells's 1920 book The Outline of History, which, he says, was the first widely read 
general history of life. Not only were civilizations far away from Europe in time and 
space treated earnestly and sympathetically, but also the prehistory of life since 
Cambrian, hundreds of million years ago..4. 
Naess' reaction to this book was again characteristic of his enthusiasm for diversity and 
his lack of incentive to judge one thing as higher, nobler, or more right than any other: 
What an immense and sudden expansion of my own life's frame of 
reference! I found that I ought to pay attention just as much to all this life 
history as to that of my own country. All geological periods had the right to 
be taken seriously and also all creatures, past or present. 
By the age of fifteen Naess had largely traded the "interminable" and "horrible" 
nightmares that had afflicted him throughout childhood for nights with little or no sleep. 
Turning this situation to advantage, Naess says that, in his imagination, he traversed life 
history on a Wellsian scale "again and again" during the sleepless nights of his later 
teenage years. And this gave rise to what he describes as "a crucial experience:" 
I divided life history from Cambrian into one week of nights - with my own 
life at the very end of the week. It would comprise only a fraction of a 
second. What would be worthwhile in this fraction of a second? I was 
never in any doubt as to the correct answer: to have a look at the 
marvellous world, to find out a little about it. Humans were the first species 
that had the capacity to get a little acquainted with the universe. Devoted 
scientists, or rather 'researchers,' seemed to be those who could satisfy the 
yearning to find out about the universe, so I started to get the feeling that 
research would be the right occupation in life. What a joy to get acquainted 
with the overwhelming richness of our planet! 
3. The Vienna Circle 
In that minuscule fraction of a second of the post-Cambrian week in which Naess found 
himself in Vienna in 1934, he says that he "dropped by chance into the famous seminar 
led by Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann" (i.e., the Vienna Circle). Despite the 
apparently casual beginning to this association, Naess' meeting with the members of this 
group was to prove a fateful one for the development of his future philosophical work. To 
understand why this was to be so, however, it is first necessary to have some 
acquaintance with the views and influence of this group. 
The Vienna Circle constituted what was probably the single most influential recognizable 
grouping of philosophers - at least upon Anglo-American philosophy - this century. It 
formed around Moritz Schlick during the 1920s following his appointment in 1922 to the 
chair in History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences at Vienna University. This 
chair had been established by Ernst Mach in 1895. True to Mach's own orientation, the 
Circle was both strongly pro-science and anti-metaphysical (this extremely positive 
evaluation of science to the exclusion of other modes of inquiry usually being referred to 
as positivism). This meant that the Circle's supporters represented a small minority group 
among German-speaking philosophers, since these, in the main, still subscribed to one 
form or another of German idealism. But the Circle's very isolation also made for strong 
European and international affiliations. Thus, while direct membership of the Circle 
included such luminaries as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Friedrich 
Waismann, and Kurt Godel, the Circle also counted among its close associates members 
of the Berlin group of logical empiricists, led by Hans Reichenbach and including Carl 
Hempel, and the Warsaw Circle of mathematical logicians, which included Alfred Tarski. 
The Vienna Circle held regular, informal Thursday meetings until Schlick was shot and 
fatally wounded by a deranged student in 1936. The rise of Nazism ensured the 
subsequent dispersal of the Circle's remaining members (some, like Carnap and Feigl, 
had left Vienna before Schlick's death) as well that of their associates in Berlin and 
Warsaw. Many members of the Circle (as well as some of their Berlin and Warsaw 
associates, including Reichenbach, Hempel, and Tarski) eventually took up academic 
appointments in locations across the United States. 
Often described as logical positivists, a number of the Circle's members and associates 
preferred (or came to prefer) the description logical empiricists. The classic statement of 
the Vienna Circle's position was advanced in their manifesto of 1929 entitled The 
Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle. This recalled Hume and was 
heavily influenced by the philosophy of logical atomism (i.e., the views of Russell and, 
especially, the early Wittgenstein) in advancing the view that the only meaningful 
statements were those expressing claims that were empirically verifiable (i.e., the 
propositions of science) or, if they did not assert anything about the way the world was 
(and so could not be empirically verified), those that simply explicated the meanings of 
terms as agreed by convention (i.e., statements whose truth was analytic or tautological, 
as in the truths of mathematics and logic). The upshot of this view was, first, that much of 
philosophy was dismissed as meaningless, since many or all of the propositions that were 
advanced in discussions of metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, for example, could not be 
empirically verified. Second, and consequent upon this, the proper task of philosophy was 
to assist the development of science by tending to the clarification of logic, language, and 
scientific method. 
In considering metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic statements to be nonsensical, the 
Vienna Circle meant that they lacked "cognitive meaning," which is to say that they were 
not statements of a kind that could be verified by any potentially accessible facts and, 
hence, that they conveyed no information of any consequence about the world. However, 
such statements might still be meaningful in a noncognitive sense since they could still 
have emotional associations. In this sense, then, metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic 
statements could at least be said to differ from totally nonsensical jumbles of words. 
The Vienna Circle's "no-nonsense" approach to philosophy, which, as I have noted, ran 
counter to the then dominant metaphysical tendency of German-speaking philosophy, 
presumably accorded well with the young Naess' own "detestation and fear of being 
influenced by manifestations of spirituality and high-sounding notions." At any rate, 
Naess certainly found himself made welcome by the members of the Circle: "The logical 
empiricists received me with touching cordiality, and for some years treated me as a new 
comet on the philosophical firmament." Naess also quickly came to respect the members 
of this group not only for the power of their ideas but also for the quality of their 
discussions, which exhibited the virtues of clarity, congeniality, and democratic 
participation. With respect to congeniality, Naess has told me that, rather than disagreeing 
in an outright manner, one member might, for example, say to another: "I think perhaps 
that is an unhappy formulation.".5. And with respect to democratic participation, Naess 
felt that this applied to the point where he was accepted on a par with everyone else. 
But in spite of Naess' youthful attraction to the "hard-headed" ethos of the Vienna Circle, 
the Circle's high estimation of him, his respect for their intellects, and his admiration for 
the modus operandi of their meetings, he nevertheless found that he had significant 
disagreements with fundamental aspects of their philosophical orientation. Specifically, 
Naess objected to "their belief that the study of language and formal logic could 
somehow contribute in an essential way to the 'solution,' or at least 'dissolution' [a la the 
early Wittgenstein], of philosophical problems." Much of Naess' early work must, 
therefore, be understood as that of someone who was both strongly influenced by, and 
strongly reacting against, the philosophical orientation of the Vienna Circle. 
In this general respect, at least, Naess can be compared to Karl Popper. However, Naess' 
reaction against the philosophical orientation of the Circle can be seen as more radical 
than that of Popper. Whereas Popper's work on the logic of scientific discovery 
represented a reaction against certain (verificationist) views of the Vienna Circle, Popper 
still shared the Circle's general concern with the logical demarcation of language: where 
members of the Circle employed the criterion of verification in an attempt to demarcate 
meaningful statements from nonsensical ones, Popper employed the criterion of 
falsification to the considerably more modest end of attempting to demarcate scientific 
statements from nonscientific (as distinct from nonsensical) ones. In contrast to both the 
Vienna Circle and Popper, however, Naess wanted to call into question this whole turn 
"towards logic rather than experience in the broadest sense." In Naess' view 
The naturalist approach is neglected in Western academic philosophy in 
favour of epistemic logic, logic of discovery and other approaches which 
avoid broad empirical confrontations. It is as if logical considerations are 
considered more philosophical in themselves than empirical.... The turn of 
(Western) philosophy in this century towards language rather than cosmos, 
towards logic rather than experience in the broadest sense (like that of 
William James), is a turn into a vast blind-alley...the turn from cosmos to 
language is not a shortcut to truth. 
Thus, when Naess came to develop his own ideas on the philosophy of language and 
communication over the next two decades he was more concerned with exploring the 
ways in which language is actually used in particular contexts than with the logical 
demarcation of meaningful statements from nonsensical ones (like the Vienna Circle) or 
scientific statements from nonscientific ones (like Karl Popper). In order to distinguish 
his approach to semantics (i.e., the study of meaning) from the dominant logical approach 
to semantics, Naess therefore called his naturalistic approach, with its empirical and 
contextual emphases, empirical semantics. 
4. Empirical Semantics.6. 
The Vienna Circle's philosophy of logical positivism or logical empiricism echoed that of 
the logical atomists (Russell and the early Wittgenstein) in treating language as if it were 
ultimately unambiguous in character: a proposition could be shown either to be saying 
something that was clear and distinct or to be nonsensical. For Naess, however, it was 
empirically demonstrable that the same proposition could be interpreted in different ways 
depending upon the people interpreting and the situation that applied. Thus, whereas the 
logical atomists and logical empiricists would have been quite happy to state that 
sentence p either is or is not logically equivalent in meaning to sentence q, Naess, and the 
group that he influenced (the "Oslo group"), denied the adequacy of such a judgment by 
pointing to the empirical fact (or its possibility) that p is only synonymous (or not 
synonymous) with q for some people in some situations. 
But Naess was not only interested in the various ways (or directions) in which the same 
proposition could be interpreted, he was also interested in differences in what he referred 
to as the depth of intention that these interpretations could display. To understand the 
distinction between Naess' concepts of direction of interpretation and depth of intention it 
is necessary to understand his concept of precization. An expression p is defined as a 
precization of another expression q if the reasonable interpretations that can be made of p 
are a subset of the reasonable interpretations that can be made of q. (An interpretation of 
q is an expression that is synonymous with q for some person in some situation whereas a 
reasonable interpretation of q is an expression that is synonymous with q for many people 
in many situations.) In less formal language, then, one expression is a precization of 
another if it is both a more precise interpretation of that expression and one that might 
often be made. It follows that every reasonable interpretation of the precization will 
necessarily be a reasonable interpretation of the original expression. 
Using this concept of precization, Naess showed that we can construct chains of 
precizations in various directions of interpretation. For example, consider an ostensibly 
straightforward expression such as "all men are equal." Does the reader take this to mean 
that "all humans are equal" or that "all male humans are equal"? The former option is a 
reasonable interpretation of the point of departure formulation without being a precization 
of it in that the reasonable interpretations of both are equivalent. However, the latter 
option is a precization of the point of departure formulation in that its reasonable 
interpretations are more restricted than (or a subset of) those that can be made of the 
original expression. In either case, we can go on to ask, for example: Is the expression 
taken to mean that "all humans (or male humans) are the equal in the eyes of God" or that 
"all humans (or male humans) have equal moral worth" or that "all humans (or male 
humans) are equal before the law" (and so on)? All of these formulations are precizations 
(or further precizations) of the point of departure formulation. If we select just one of 
these branches or directions of interpretation - for example, "all humans have equal moral 
worth" - we can go on to ask, for example: is this expression in turn taken to mean that 
"all humans should be treated with the same degree of respect regardless of how they 
behave" or that "all humans should be treated with the same degree of respect providing 
that they observe certain social norms" (and so on)? And so the ramification process can 
be continued. Naess wrote: 
Sooner or later a situation arises where the subject must admit, if honest, 
that (1) if he made a definite interpretation of the sentence at all, he either 
must have intended a or non-a (a certain distinction). Further, (2) that he 
neither intended a nor non-a, being unaware of the possibility of making 
the distinction at issue (e.g., between ton as a measure of volume and ton as 
a measure of weight [Naess' own discussion in this context being in regard 
to the point of departure expression 'The ship was of 5,000 tons'])..7. 
The extent to which a person discriminates along a chain of precizations (and, therefore, 
in a particular direction of interpretation) is a measure of their depth of intention, that is, 
the depth to which that person can claim to have understood the intended meaning of the 
expression. Thus, as Ingemund Gullvag notes in his study of Naess' concept of depth of 
intention: 
People may differ in their responses not only by choosing different 
branches of interpretation but by stopping at different levels of 
discrimination within the same branch. If two persons choose the same 
branch but stop at different levels of discrimination within that branch, we 
say they have understood [the point of departure formulation] with 
different depths of intention..8. 
5. Empirical Semantics and Psychoanalysis 
I think it is arguable that Naess' experience of psychoanalysis, which took place in 
Vienna at the same time as his contact with the Vienna Circle, may well have provided 
him with a powerful stimulus to the development of the central concepts in his 
philosophy of language and communication. To begin with, both psychoanalysis and 
Naess' concept of depth of intention are concerned with depth of understanding - the 
former with one's depth of understanding of one's self and the latter with one's depth of 
understanding of others. Thus, where Freudian psychoanalysis is concerned with 
revealing the extent to which a person is unaware or unconscious of the deeper meanings 
of their own utterances (whether these be the free association of seemingly unconnected 
items, verbal accounts of dreams, slips of the tongue, instances of forgetfulness, or jokes), 
Naess' empirical semantics is concerned with revealing the extent to which a person is 
unaware or unconscious of the deeper meanings of someone else's utterances (i.e., 
unaware or unconscious of distinctions that were intended by the speaker). 
It should be emphasized that this parallel does not point to the existence of a 
commonality between empirical semantics and some incidental feature of psychoanalysis; 
rather, the possibility of differences in depth of interpretation is a fundamental feature of 
psychoanalysis. The whole point of psychoanalysis is to uncover or reveal material that 
has been repressed by the conscious mind, so that this material can then be integrated into 
the personality structure rather than continue to operate like a "back-seat driver"—albeit 
one that the patient has been (or has preferred to be) largely unaware of. Thus, for 
example, psychoanalysts are not particularly interested in what they see as the superficial 
manifest content of a dream, but are virtually interested in what they take to be its deeper, 
more significant, latent content. Precisely because of this emphasis on depth of 
understanding, psychoanalysis is often simply referred to as depth psychology. 
Second, in both psychoanalysis and empirical semantics, one reveals or makes conscious 
a person's depth of understanding by a process of verbal probing. While the generality of 
this parallel could make it seem insignificant to us today, it needs to be remembered that 
the verbal probing approach to psychiatry and semantics was, in both cases, revolutionary 
at the time. Psychoanalysis was originally distinguished from other approaches to mental 
disorder that were then current (such as hydrotherapy, electrotherapy, massage, the Weir 
Mitchell rest-cure, and hypnosis) by the fact that it was based purely on verbal probing. 
Naess' empirical approach to semantics was likewise distinguished from its then current 
alternatives (i.e., the logical approaches inspired by the Vienna Circle) by also being 
based on verbal probing. For Naess, the synonymity or otherwise of sentence p and 
sentence q, for example, was not a question to be decided on logical grounds but rather a 
question to be decided by asking person x in situation y whether p was synonymous with 
q for them. 
It is also interesting to note in regard to this second point that just as the person who 
initiates the verbal probing in psychoanalysis is referred to as the analyst, so the person 
who asks the questions in Naess' empirical semantics (in order to reveal such things as the 
subject's depth of intention) is also referred to as the analyst..9. 
Third, the central role given in psychoanalysis to the interpretation of highly complex and 
exceedingly ambiguous material (such as the free association of seemingly unconnected 
items, dreams, slips of the tongue, instances of forgetfulness, and jokes) inevitably 
highlights the fact that interpreters of the same material can differ not only with respect to 
their depth of interpretation—which was my first point—but also with respect to their 
direction of interpretation. The possibility of differences in direction of interpretation 
must impress itself upon anyone who undertakes psychoanalysis: the patient and the 
analyst—or two different analysts, for that matter—may both address themselves to what 
they take to be the latent content of a dream, for example, but nevertheless interpret this 
content in significantly different directions. Thus, the ideas or both depth and direction or 
interpretation or understanding are as central to psychoanalysis as they are to Naess' 
empirical semantics. 
The parallels I have pointed to between psychoanalysis and empirical semantics take on 
added significance when one bears in mind the fact that Naess undertook and would have 
been reflecting upon his "deadly serious," six-days-a-week, fourteen-month experience of 
psychoanalysis at the same time as he was reflecting upon the views he was being 
exposed to by the members of the Vienna Circle. Taking all these considerations into 
account, then, I think one can make a persuasive case for the claim that Naess' experience 
of psychoanalysis provided him - whether consciously or unconsciously! - with a 
powerful stimulus to the development of the central concepts in his philosophy of 
language and communication. 
6. Depth of Intention, Deepness of Questions, and Deep Ecology 
While Naess formally developed the concept of depth of intention in his empirically 
oriented work on semantics, that hardly exhausts the depth theme in his work. Rather, this 
theme spills over into many of Naess' other writings for an obvious reason that derives 
directly from his work on empirical semantics, namely, that work showed that all our 
understandings can be thought of as having a depth dimension. For simplicity, I have only 
considered the concept of depth of intention in regard to a person's immediate 
understanding of a simple proposition but, as we all know, if the object of study is 
complex, then, as Naess says, "our depth of intention improves only slowly over years of 
study. There is an abyss of depth in everything fundamental.".10. 
The concept of depth of intention clearly implies a complementary concept: depth of 
questioning. If one's focus in a question/answer string is upon the answers given then, in 
Naess' terminology, one will speak in terms of depth of intention (which, in this context, 
could also be termed deepness of answers). If, however, one's focus is upon the questions 
asked then, again in Naess' terminology, one will speak in terms of deepness of questions. 
Analogous to the situation in Naess' work on empirical semantics, where it was shown 
that people can understand an utterance with differing depths of intention (some being 
aware of intended distinctions the possibility of which does not occur to others), 
consideration of the concept of deepness of questions reveals that people can also ask 
questions of an utterance that differ with respect to depth (some asking questions the 
possibility of which does not occur to others). Moreover, consideration of this concept 
also reveals that questions can be used in either a passive way, simply to gauge a person's 
depth of intention (as in Naess' work on empirical semantics), or in an active way, to 
deliberately stimulate an increase in a person's depth of understanding. 
It was this concern with the active sense of the concept of depth of questioning that led 
Naess to refer to his own approach to ecophilosophy as deep ecology. For Naess, "The 
essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions. The adjective 'deep' stresses that we 
ask why and how, where others do not." As I show in Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, 
Naess repeats this point again and again in his work on deep ecology. He says that by the 
term deep ecology he means to refer "primarily to the level of questioning, not the 
content of the answer"; that "The difference between the shallow and deep movement is 
one of...deepness of questions"; that "The term 'deep' refers to the depth of questioning"; 
that "the deep ecology movement is therefore 'the ecology movement which questions 
deeper'"; and so on..11. 
To sum up, then, I hope to have shown, albeit very briefly, that Naess' early involvement 
in psychoanalysis and involvement with the Vienna Circle jointly informed the 
development of his work on empirical semantics and that one of the central ideas in this 
work - depth of intention - implied a complementary idea - depth of questions - that, in 
turn, directly inspired Naess' subsequent development of what he chose to refer to as a 
deep approach to ecological concerns. 
7. In Conclusion 
On a personal note, I find Naess' concepts of direction of interpretation, depth of 
intention, and depth of questions tremendously useful for my own thinking in regard to a 
wide range of philosophical problems - including the problem of what philosophy is! (in 
brief, it's about asking deeper questions) - and would like to do what I can to get these 
ideas across to a wider audience. My problem with the concept of depth of questions as it 
applies to deep ecology, however, is that I do not think that asking deeper questions, by 
itself, provides any guarantee that the answers thus elicited will necessarily be of an 
ecocentric (as opposed to anthropocentric) kind. For this reason, I find myself, in this 
particular context, drawn far more to the (ecocentric) content of Naess' own answer to his 
deepest questions about living in the world than to his method of asking deeper questions 
per se. The content of Naess' own answer with respect to these questions has to do with 
the realization of our capacity to identify more widely and deeply with the world around 
us. And it is this emphasis on our capacity to identify beyond (or trans-) our own small, 
egoic, personal concerns that has led me to characterize what is most distinctive and 
defensible about his approach to ecosophy and support of the deep ecology movement as 
representing a transpersonal approach to ecological concerns. Thus, while I may think 
that the term deep ecology is, as it were, an "unhappy" formulation, I am at one with 
Naess on the content of his views. But all this, as they say, is another story, or, more 
precisely, another argument, and one that I have presented at length elsewhere (see 
Toward a Transpersonal Ecology). 
For now, it remains to say that my thanks to Arne Naess for the inspiration that his own 
fascinating intellectual path and enriching friendship has bequeathed to this particular 
thinker cannot be adequately expressed in words. Even so, here's a thoroughly inadequate 
"point of departure formulation" that I trust will be interpreted by all with a very great 
depth of intention: Thank you, Arne! 
Notes 
1. I provide a brief overview of the range and influence of Naess' work since the 1930s in 
my book Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for 
Environmentalism (Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, 1990), see pp. 81-91.
[Reprinted earlier in this issue of The Trumpeter.] 
2. To avoid cluttering the text with notes I shall simply state that, unless otherwise noted, 
all quotations from Naess herein are from his brief, candid autobiographical article "How 
My Philosophy Seemed to Develop," in Philosophers on Their Own Work, vol. 10, ed. 
Andre Mercier and Maja Svilar (Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), pp. 209-226. Despite the fact 
that this article represents the most sustained piece of autobiographical writing that Naess 
has published, it seems to be hardly known. 
3. Freud was based in Vienna until 1938 when the Nazis invaded Austria and he was 
forced to flee to England. He died in London (of cancer) the following year. The Vienna 
Circle met until Moritz Schlick, its founder, was murdered in 1936 (more on the break up 
of the Circle later in the paper). 
4. The Cambrian period refers to the period that ran from around 570 to 500 million years 
ago that constituted the beginning of the Palaeozoic era (570-225 million years ago). As 
Stephen J. Gould notes in his marvellous book Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and 
the Nature of History (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 55, "the inception of the 
Palaeozoic era denotes a concentrated episode of [biological] diversification—the 
'Cambrian explosion', or first appearance of multicellular animals with hard parts in the 
fossil record." 
5. Personal conversations, Oslo, June 1984 and September 1990; and Perth, Western 
Australia, and Hobart, Tasmania, March 1986. 
6. Naess' major elaboration of his approach to semantics is Interpretation and 
Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communication (Oslo: Oslo University 
Press, 1953). A simpler, more popularly aimed presentation is Naess' Communication and 
Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1966, reprinted 
1981). For briefer overviews of Naess' approach to semantics, see Arne Naess, "Toward a 
Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness," in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, 
ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1952), pp. 248-
269; and Ingemund Gullvag, "Depth of Intention," Inquiry 26 (1983): 31-83. 
7. Naess, "Toward a Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness," p. 257. 
8. Gullvag, "Depth of Intention," p. 35. 
9. See, for example, Naess, "Toward a Theory of Interpretation and Preciseness." 
10. Arne Naess, "Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism or Through Mahayana 
Buddhism to Spinoza?," in Spinoza's Philosophy of Man: Proceedings of the 
Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium 1977, ed. Jon Wetlesen (Oslo: University of Oslo 
Press, 1978), pp. 143. 
11. For references for these quotations and many other similar ones by Naess - as well as 
an extended discussion of this point - see chs. 4 and 5 of Toward a Transpersonal 
Ecology. 
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